Författare Ämne: Kanev-Luftlandsättningen  (läst 2026 gånger)

A F

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Kanev-Luftlandsättningen
« skrivet: 10 augusti 2010 kl. 21:03:49 »
Ett legendariskt fiasko som jag har äran att skriva lite om. Tre snabba frågor till den som kanske har tillgång till detta lilla slag i spelform.

• Vem beordrade operationen? Vatutin? Nån på STAVKA?

• Vem ledde den flygburna kåren?

• Vad använde man för transportflygplan?
« Senast ändrad: 1 januari 1970 kl. 01:00:00 av A F »

Strv102r

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« Svar #1 skrivet: 10 augusti 2010 kl. 22:04:27 »
APs Red parachutes som jag ju spelat och redovisat på forumet har knappt några historical notes alls. Men S&T 115 Kanev har det i form av en artikel av John Prados.

Vatiutin gav den slutliga ordern den 24 i samråd med bla Zhukov. Men resurserna var knappast frontresurser utan tilldelades från högre instans.

Den luftburna kåren leddas av General Zatevakhin vars stab var tillfälligt sammansatt.

Flygplanstyper nämns inte.
« Senast ändrad: 1 januari 1970 kl. 01:00:00 av Strv102r »
Ola Palmquist

Spelar nu: MIHs A Famous Victory

A F

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« Svar #2 skrivet: 11 augusti 2010 kl. 09:51:50 »
Citat från: "Strv102r"
Vatiutin gav den slutliga ordern den 24 i samråd med bla Zhukov.


Det var tänkt att man skulle hoppa dagen innan. Yolkar detta som att Vatiutin sa "go".
« Senast ändrad: 1 januari 1970 kl. 01:00:00 av A F »

sfclinken

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« Svar #3 skrivet: 11 augusti 2010 kl. 10:32:18 »
Jag vill minnas att jag läste någonstans att de nyttjade PS-84: or och IL-4: or.  cirka 200 flyplan användes varav 150 var IL-4: or. Dessutom nyttjade man både segelflyg och glidflygplan.

Jag är ganska dålig på ryskt trp-flyg men IL-4:an var i grund och botten ett bombflyg men jag antar man kanske kunde trycka in folk i dom också...
« Senast ändrad: 1 januari 1970 kl. 01:00:00 av sfclinken »
GMY Peter

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Tommy Röhs

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« Svar #4 skrivet: 11 augusti 2010 kl. 14:05:45 »
1943 DNEPR AIRBORNE OPERATION: LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Author: N. V. STASKOV
Lt. Gen. N. V. STASKOV, Chief of Staff of Airborne Troops, Candidate of Military Sciences



Nikolai Viktorovich STASKOV was born in the village of Buda, Krasninsky District, Smolensk Region, on August 28, 1951. Graduated from Ryazan Higher Airborne Troops Command School (1973), M. V. Frunze Military Academy (1983), and RF General Staff Academy (1993). Held the whole range of positions from airborne platoon commander to airborne division commander; was also commander of a training airborne division and head of the Airborne Troops training center.

From September 1998, Deputy Commander of the Airborne Troops (for the Peacekeeping Forces); from October, Chief of Staff-First Deputy Commander of the Airborne Troops. Took part in combat operations in Ethiopia and Chechnya.

On routing, in summer 1943, 60 years ago, a German battle group near Kursk, the Soviet forces pressed home an attack in the South-Western strategic sector in a bid to reach the midstream Dnepr area and, without a halt, to seize a beachhead on the river's western bank. They did cross the Dnepr without a pause in operations and seize a number of beachheads, something that made it possible to deploy there several major battle groups of the Voronezh Front (commander Army General N. F. Vatutin) that had scored the most spectacular advances. The objective was to perform a subsequent swoop in order to capture the Left-Bank Ukraine. The enemy resistance flagged in early September: no longer hoping to withhold the Soviet advance in the Kiev sector, the German command started pulling back its forces to the right bank of the Dnepr, where it organized defenses.

The rapid advance of the friendly forward units prepared the ground for a major airborne assault landing with a view to capturing a beachhead on the western bank of the Dnepr and aiding a crossing by the forward combined units of the friendly forces. The command of the Voronezh Front had conceived a plan to use an airborne assault force on the Dnepr as far back as summer. It was intended to land troops in the Kiev area in order to prepare the ground for a rapid taking of the Ukrainian capital. The Supreme High Command had approved the idea, but the operational situation shaped differently, calling for an urgent airborne landing in the environs of the Dnepr's Bukrin bend, where there was a promise of bigger successes.

Three airborne brigades were assigned to conduct the operation. Since all three were intended for a joint action in one area, the plan was to merge them in an airborne corps under Deputy Commander of the Airborne Troops Maj. Gen. I. I. Zatevakhin, with a number of Airborne Troops Staff officers selected to form the staff of the corps. To assist the landing, Long-Range Aviation (LRA) set aside 180 Li-2 planes and 35 gliders. Air support was due to come from 150 Il-4 and B-25 (U. S. -made) planes. The forming-up place included the Bogodukhov and the Lebedin airfield complexes (five airfields all in all). It was planned to complete concentration of forces and assets assigned to the airborne assault two days before the landing that was due to take place in the night of September 24.

Planning the operation was the Front's operations directorate, mostly an Airborne Troops Staff command group, which joined the Voronezh Front Staff in early September. Informed about the decision to use an airborne assault force on the Dnepr, the AT Commander, Maj. Gen. A. G. Kapitokhin, ordered the brigades to the forming-up place. Before September 17, the brigades were preparing, in their permanent deployment locations (1st AB, Teikovo; 3rd AB, Shchyolkovo; 5th AB, Kirzhach), for the forthcoming airdrop in the enemy rear area. Preparations finished, they moved in by rail to the forming-up place.

A delay in materiel delivery and an extremely intense military rail traffic in the Front's rear area were the reasons why the brigades massed at the airfields three days later than the planned date. Thus, in the forming-up place they had less than one day to prepare for the airdrop. In addition, at first only eight transport planes had arrived. For that reason the landing was postponed by one day. But even then all detailed airborne transport aircraft failed to appear. LRA Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. N. S. Skripko, who was in charge of the air action, was doing his best, if with little effect, to get the planes and prepare them for the mission. The result was inadequate and that subsequently led to grave pilot errors.


[/url]http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/5687232http://resten av artikeln får man betala för.
« Senast ändrad: 1 januari 1970 kl. 01:00:00 av Tommy Röhs »

Tommy Röhs

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« Senast ändrad: 1 januari 1970 kl. 01:00:00 av Tommy Röhs »

Mat-Göt

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« Svar #6 skrivet: 15 augusti 2010 kl. 11:35:55 »
Jag har ett ex av People's Wargames "Kanev" som senare omtrycktes i S&T. Har du tillgång till detta? I S&T var det en lång artikel, jag lägger tidningen i ditt fack på torsdag om 1) du inte redan har tidningen/spelet och 2) jag kommer ihåg det.
« Senast ändrad: 1 januari 1970 kl. 01:00:00 av Mat-Göt »